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Goetz v. Kunstler 44 8
(decided March 14, 1995)

Plaintiff, Bernhard Goetz, commenced an action against
William Kunstler and Carol Communications, Inc., to recover
damages for "certain false, scandalous, malicious and defamatory
statements" made about him in an autobiography entitled "My
Life as a Radical Lawyer" by William M. Kunstler and published
by Carol Communications Inc. 449 Kunstler argued that his
statements were protected free expression under the New York
State 450 and the United States Constitutions. 451 On a motion for
summary judgment, the Supreme Court, New York County, held
that: (1) a majority of statements, including those describing the
individual as a "murderous vigilante" and as having "developed a
hatred toward black people" were nonactionable opinion, and (2)
remaining statements were either true or not actionable because
plaintiff was unable to prove that he was exposed to "public
contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace," or that the statements
induced "an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking
persons, and ...
452

deprive[d] him of their friendly intercourse in

society."
The allegedly defamatory chapter of the book entitled
"Defending Blacks in a Racist Country," described some of the
African American clients Kunstler had represented throughout his
career. 453 In one such chapter, Kunstler discusses one of his

448. 164 Misc. 2d 557, 625 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Sup. Ct. New York County

1995).
449. Id. at 559-60, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
450. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. This section emphatically commands: "Every
citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id. (emphasis added).
451. Goetz, 164 Misc. 2d at 559, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 450. See U.S. CONST.

amend. I. The First Amendment provides that: "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ....
452. Id. at 564, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 453.

" Id.

453. Id. at 558, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 449. Some of the clients Kunstler
represented include:
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African American clients, Darrell Cabey, and in a four paragraph
passage, makes statements about Bernhard Goetz that are the
4 54
basis of this defamation action.
James Dixon York and Anthony La Borde, former Black Panthers
accused of killing two New York City Police Officers; Wayne
Williams, the convicted killer in the Atlanta child murder cases; Larry
Davis, who was charged with the attempted murder of six police
officers; Alcee Hastings, an impeached Federal Judge; Yusef Salaam,
one of the youths charged with raping a Central Park jogger; and
Washington, D.C. Mayor Marion Barry.
Id.

454. Id. at 558, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 449. Kunstler wrote:
On a crowded subway train a few days before Christmas, 1984, four
black kids aggressively panhandled Bernhard Goetz for five dollars, and
he pulled out a gun and shot them. He was immediately hailed as a
hero, while the four kids, falsely reported to be armed with sharpened
screwdrivers, were labeled as evil wrongdoers. As it turned out, the
kids had not been armed, and Goetz was nothing more than a murderous
vigilante. What if the kids had been white? I'm certain that Goetz would
have been condemned by the same people who so quickly rushed to
praise him.
Goetz shot those four youths because he is paranoid and has venomous
feelings against black people. As he said publicly, he had been mugged
previously and had developed a hatred toward all blacks. In 1986, he
was convicted of weapons possession rather than attempted murder
because the white public still viewed him as a hero, and he served a
reduced sentence of six months.
A year earlier, in 1985, I had been contacted by Shirley Cabey, whose
son, Darrell, was one of Goetz's victims. She wanted to sue Goetz
because, as a result of the shooting, her son was paralyzed and would
never walk again. Also, the Cabey family had incurred enormous
medical expenses and needed help to pay the bills. Along with Ron, I
brought a $50 million lawsuit and felt confident that we would
eventually win because what Goetz had admitted to the police in
Concord, Nev Hampshire, where he fled after the shootings. He told
them that, after he shot Darrell and the others, he walked up to Darrell
as he lay wounded on the seat of the subway car and said, "You seem to
be all right. Here's another."
Goetz then shot him again, and it was apparently this second bullet that
had severed Darrell's spinal column.
Goetz admitted this when we took his deposition for the Cabey family's
lawsuit. I asked, "Did you say these things to Darrell?" and he said,
"Yes." When we gave this information to the press, he lost much of his
widespread support in the white community. Ron and I have also filed a
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Specifically, plaintiff claims that certain comments made by
defendant in his book were "false, scandalous, malicious and
defamatory," 455 and that "defendants allowed these statements to

be published 'knowing they were not true, and did so with actual
malice and ill-will toward the plaintiff, and for the expressed
purpose of injuring the plaintiff's good name, reputation, feelings
and public standing, exposing him to public ridicule and loss of
esteem in the minds of a substantial number of persons in the
community. '456
Defendants argued that the allegedly defamatory statements
were constitutionally protected expressions of opinion and were
nonactionable under the defense of truth, and, therefore,
summary judgment should be granted dismissing the
complaint. 457

The Supreme Court, New York County, granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment. 458 The court cited Immuno A. G.
v. J. Moor-Jankowski459 after it explained that "[t]he free speech

provision of the New York State Constitution is broader than the

claim on Darrell's behalf with the Crime Victims Board which is still
pending, as is the lawsuit. Meanwhile, our client spends his days in a
wheelchair in his family's apartment, watching television, another
victim of the cancer of racism.
Id. at 558-59, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 449-50.
455. Id. at 559-60, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
456. Id. at 560, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 565, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
459. 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, cert. denied,
500 U.S. 954 (1991). The plaintiff brought suit for libel based on a letter to the

editor published in the Journal of Medical Primatology, a journal co-founded
and edited by the defendant Dr. J. Moor-Jankowski. Id. at 240, 567 N.E.2d at
1227, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 908. The letter criticized the plaintiff's planned use of
chimpanzees to conduct hepatitis research in Africa. Id. The letter stated that
plaintiff's plan was motivated by a desire to avoid restrictions on the
importance of chimpanzees which could eventually decimate the wild chimp
population, and could spread hepatitis to the whole chimpanzee population. Id.
Plaintiff also objected to an article in another magazine in which defendant is
quoted as criticizing the plaintiffs plan. Id. at 241, 567 N.E.2d at 1272-73,
566 N.Y.S.2d at 908-09.
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Federal Constitution." 4 60 In reaching its decision as to whether a
particular communication is actionable, the court referred to a
standard which state and federal law have both recognized. 4 6 1 In
Immuno, the court began its defamation inquiry with the key

question of whether the "challenged expression, however labeled
by defendant, would reasonably appear to state or imply
assertions of objective fact." 4 6 2 The Immuno court added that the

impression created by the statements and the general tone of the
expressions must be considered as viewed by the reasonable
person.

4 63

Furthermore, relying on the framework set out in Gross v. New
York Times Co.,464 the court concluded that the statements
complained of were constitutionally protected opinion. 4 6 5 The
court in Gross stated that there is a
distinction between a statement of opinion that implies a basis in
facts which are not disclosed to the reader or listener, [as
opposed to] a statement of opinion that is accompanied by a
recitation of the facts on which it is based or one that does not
466
imply the existence of undisclosed underlying facts.

The reason the courts have found such statements to be actionable
is because a reasonable reader or listener would infer that the
writer or speaker knows certain facts, unknown to said reader or

460. Goetz, 164 Misc. 2d at 561, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
461. Id. The court held "[b]oth State and Federal defamation law have
recognized a distinction between expressions of opinion, which are not
actionable, and assertions of fact, which may form the basis of a viable
defamation claim. Id. (citing Immuno A.G. v. J. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d
235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954
(1991)). See aLso Gross v. New York Times Co., 82 N.Y.2d 146, 623 N.E.2d
1163, 603 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1993); 600 West 115th Street Corp. v. Von Gutfeld,
80 N.Y.2d 130, 145, 603 N.E.2d 930, 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 825, 833 (1992).
462. Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 243, 567 N.E.2d at 1273, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
909.
463. Id. at 243, 567 N.E.2d at 1273-74, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 909-10.
464. 82 N.Y.2d 146, 623 N.E.2d 1163, 603 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1993).
465. Goetz, 164 Misc. 2d at 562, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
466. Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 153, 623 N.E.2d at 1168, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 818
(citations omitted).
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listener, which support the opinion and are detrimental to the
467
person toward whom the communication is directed.
In the Goetz case, the court concluded that the statements in
Kunstler's book are very likely to be read as an opinion, rather
than objective fact since they were apparently "a biased point of
view of an activist lawyer." 468 Therefore, the court held that the
statements in Kunstler's book complained of by the plaintiff were
constitutionally protected opinion. 469 Furthermore, the court, in
Goetz, found that the characterization of plaintiff, a public figure,
as "paranoid" would not be found by the ordinary intelligent
reader to impute to Goetz an actual mental or physiological
affliction, and even if it were actionable, he could not recover,
470
absent allegation of special damages.
Finally, Goetz's claim that he made the alleged racial epithets
at a time when he was still an emotional victim of a mugging is
not sufficient to support his claim that he was defamed by
statements alluding to his hatred toward blacks. 47 1 The court
concluded that the law in New York is that there is no actionable
defamation if statements complained of are substantially true. 472
In sum, when the assertion of an alleged opinion is being
analyzed by the courts in order to determine whether it is
protected speech, it is given greater deference by the New York
State Constitution than it is afforded under the Federal
Constitution. 4 73 For example, under a federal constitutional
474
analysis, courts will apply Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.
and classify the communication by type rather than by looking at

467. Id. at 153-54, 623 N.E.2d at 1168, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
468. Goetz, 164 Misc. 2d at 563, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
469. Id. at 562, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
470. Id. at 563, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 452. See also O'Brien v. Lerman, 117
A.D.2d 658, 498 N.Y.S.2d 395 (2d Dep't 1986); Moore v. Francis, 121 N.Y.
199, 23 N.E. 1127 (1890).
471. Goetz, 164 Misc. 2d at 564, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 452-53.
472. Id. (citing Han v. State, 186 A.D.2d 536, 588 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d
Dep't 1992)).
473. See generally 600 West 115th St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 80 N.Y.2d
130, 145, 603 N.E.2d 930, 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 825, 833 (1992).
474. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
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the circumstances and context surrounding the communication. 475

New York, on the other hand, refuses to stop at Milkovich and
looks at the surrounding circumstances. For example, in Immuno,
the court stated that the federal test which consists of "[i]solating
challenged speech and first extracting its express and implied
factual statements, without knowing the full context in which they

were uttered, indeed may result in identifying many more implied
factual assertions than would a reasonable person encountering
that expression in context." 4 7 6 The State of New York chose to

look at the surrounding circumstances from a reasonable person
perspective specifically for the purpose of giving its citizens extra
protection beyond that afforded under the Federal Constitution.

477
Rojas v. Debevoise & Plimpton
(decided October 27, 1995)

The plaintiff argued that statements made by the plaintiff's
former employer to employees constituted actionable
defamation. 478 In response the defendants argued that the
statements were protected by a qualified privilege. 4 7 9 The court,

agreeing with the defendants, held that the statements were
protected by a qualified privilege, which was not overcome by a

475. Id. at 21.
476. Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
917.
477. 634 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1995).
478. Id. at 361-62. In addition to the cause of action for defamation, the
complaint alleged a second cause of action for breach of employment
relationship. Id. at 359. This breach of employment relationship arose out of
an allegation that because the plaintiff "testified truthfully to the FBI" during
the course of an investigation of her employer, she was requested to resign
from her position within the law firm. Id. at 360. The court dismissed this
cause of action because the plaintiff did not proffer any "facts... to show that
defendants frustrated plaintiff's compliance with the core purposes of her
employment" and therefore there was "no breach of contract claim stated." Id.
at 361.
479. Id. at 362.
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